In the previous post I noted that in some sense morality limits itself. Living a virtuous life may come at considerable cost to oneself and one's duty to be fair to oneself may have to be taken into consideration and this consideration is a moral consideration itself. There may be other reasons to see certain moral ideals as being limited by morality. Consider the moral ideal some people may have of being completely selfless. Some people may value this and there may even have been a few people in history that were. All of their interests and time and effort were taken to relieve the suffering of other people or to increase their happiness. But I think that this kind of life has something against it. It is not universalizable under the categorical imperative for one.
Consider a "society" of two such completely selfless individuals, A and B. A's interests all lay in furthering B's interests and vice versa. But what are all of B's interests? Well, they are A's interests and so on. This would be a kind of infinite regress of the worst kind. This reasoning would work for a society of any size greater than two as well. So we seem to need some selfish interest that further our end in itself under such a scheme.
Friday, January 28, 2011
Be good but not too good
Many wise people like Kant have known that the good tend to suffer far more than their fair share in life. It often costs considerably in terms of suffering to live a just life in an unjust world. People have gone to prison, suffered social costs, lost all their positions, been tortured, and even lost their lives to further a just cause.
This claim that the good tend to suffer far more than is their fair share is not just a cliche but has some odd moral implications. There seems to be some limits to how far we ought to live a virtuous life if that life will harm us. If as many philosophers have thought, we have a moral duty to ourselves to be good to ourselves there may be limits to how moral we ought to be from morality itself. This would be one way morality limits itself. Many philosophers have given such an argument against suicide. We have duty to ourselves to not only be good to ourselves, to treat ourselves fairly but to maintain our lives. If some people are living lives at terrible costs to themselves because they are trying to be the best people they can be in the face of evil, do they have a moral obligation to not live a life that is so harmful? In other words, how much does their moral obligation towards themselves to be fair factor into consideration when deciding what kind of life they should live? Should they be martyrs? That seems to be asking too much if we are to take their obligations to their own lives seriously. Their obligation to their just cause may have to be balanced against their obligation to themselves.
But how do we respond to those who would use this as an argument that we ought to live a virtuous life that would not cost anymore than it is expected of the average person (or no less). If anymore, it would be "unfair" to us. If less than it would be a life that is in some way a life of "moral freeloading." How are we to become better people if we only ought to seek moral mediocrity?
My suggestion against this is that we ought to change our fundamental value structure so that we derive happiness and pleasure from being virtuous itself and displeasure at not being virtuous as much as possible for us individually. In this way, we change, and the pleasure we derive from doing good for its own sake is balanced out by the negative consequences of being virtuous in a unjust world. The burden on our shoulders is lightened by the mere fact of us reorienting our fundamental values so that the costs are balanced by some benefit to ourselves. Many people when they take up a cause reorient their values so that they come to derive pleasure from contributing to a just cause automatically. But often this does not work as many people, I think, do not further just causes as much as they know they should because they are afraid of the social costs. But if they work on consciously valuing certain ethical values in themselves more than they do, they would change their fundamental outlook. Society can further this as Kant suggests by creating and endorsing certain kinds of moral parables that show and celebrate people who have lived virtuous lives all to no benefit to themselves but at considerable costs (they were not rewarded or even recognized for their actions either in their life times or in the after life and suffered greatly). Too often will tell children lies that being good will be rewarded with some benefit when that is often the opposite of the truth. Instead, they should learn to value doing good for itself.
However, no matter how much we try, I believe there are limits to the "wiggle room" in how much we can change our value structure. We are, for the most parts (except for those rare people capable of being happy martyrs), simply constrained by our nature to not go behind certain limits and be too selfless coming at a cost to ourselves. To each his own, but I have no doubt that most people are capable of far more reevaluation of their fundamental values than is the case.
This claim that the good tend to suffer far more than is their fair share is not just a cliche but has some odd moral implications. There seems to be some limits to how far we ought to live a virtuous life if that life will harm us. If as many philosophers have thought, we have a moral duty to ourselves to be good to ourselves there may be limits to how moral we ought to be from morality itself. This would be one way morality limits itself. Many philosophers have given such an argument against suicide. We have duty to ourselves to not only be good to ourselves, to treat ourselves fairly but to maintain our lives. If some people are living lives at terrible costs to themselves because they are trying to be the best people they can be in the face of evil, do they have a moral obligation to not live a life that is so harmful? In other words, how much does their moral obligation towards themselves to be fair factor into consideration when deciding what kind of life they should live? Should they be martyrs? That seems to be asking too much if we are to take their obligations to their own lives seriously. Their obligation to their just cause may have to be balanced against their obligation to themselves.
But how do we respond to those who would use this as an argument that we ought to live a virtuous life that would not cost anymore than it is expected of the average person (or no less). If anymore, it would be "unfair" to us. If less than it would be a life that is in some way a life of "moral freeloading." How are we to become better people if we only ought to seek moral mediocrity?
My suggestion against this is that we ought to change our fundamental value structure so that we derive happiness and pleasure from being virtuous itself and displeasure at not being virtuous as much as possible for us individually. In this way, we change, and the pleasure we derive from doing good for its own sake is balanced out by the negative consequences of being virtuous in a unjust world. The burden on our shoulders is lightened by the mere fact of us reorienting our fundamental values so that the costs are balanced by some benefit to ourselves. Many people when they take up a cause reorient their values so that they come to derive pleasure from contributing to a just cause automatically. But often this does not work as many people, I think, do not further just causes as much as they know they should because they are afraid of the social costs. But if they work on consciously valuing certain ethical values in themselves more than they do, they would change their fundamental outlook. Society can further this as Kant suggests by creating and endorsing certain kinds of moral parables that show and celebrate people who have lived virtuous lives all to no benefit to themselves but at considerable costs (they were not rewarded or even recognized for their actions either in their life times or in the after life and suffered greatly). Too often will tell children lies that being good will be rewarded with some benefit when that is often the opposite of the truth. Instead, they should learn to value doing good for itself.
However, no matter how much we try, I believe there are limits to the "wiggle room" in how much we can change our value structure. We are, for the most parts (except for those rare people capable of being happy martyrs), simply constrained by our nature to not go behind certain limits and be too selfless coming at a cost to ourselves. To each his own, but I have no doubt that most people are capable of far more reevaluation of their fundamental values than is the case.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Morality of attraction
In this episode of the FX series Louie, the eponymous star of the show is out on a date with a woman who he apparently likes and she seemed to like him. They are in a coffee shop and trying to have a conversation when a few jocks come in and start behaving obnoxiously and talking loudly. Louie asks them to quite down. This pisses one of the jocks off so bad he decides to come to Louie's table and harass him and his date. The bully is persistent in his bullying of Louie and is physically intimidating him, trying to instigate a fight. But Louie refuses to fight the younger and much more physically fit man. Eventually, Louie caves in to the bullying and "apologizes" to the bully for asking him and his buddies to quite down.
Louie's date then seem to loose all interest in Louie. She seems to realize consciously that her loss of interest (and presumably sexual attraction) is irrational as getting into a physical confrontation or even risking one by being more assertive would have been foolish for Louie. But she claims she can't help it and wants to end the date. Louie gets angry at this "fickle" change of heart.
This is an instance of what I will call "the luck of circumstantial attraction." But I am more interested in what will will call "the luck of constitutive attraction" (you may now have noticed the analogy with their analogues in moral luck). Many of us are attracted to people with certain features that are culture and time specific. For example, men today, in general, like women that are a little heavier than men did 30-40 years ago. Men also tend to like women a little lighter than men liked women during when Paul Ruben painted his paintings (hence the term "Rubenesque"). Men in different cultures than ours like women that are heavier or lighter than we do in general depending on the one we're talking about. Likewise with many other features, physical, behavioral and psychological. There is a malleability there that is context and time sensitive.
What is the morality of discriminating against someone based on such arbitrary features? Louie seemed to be upset over his dates change of heart and seems to be rightfully upset especially seeing how irrational it is and how much she even realizes its irrationality but do people who are turned out by equally other arbitrary features also have a more justified complaint? Some of us are constitutively not attracted to people of certain disabilities, weights, heights, ethnicities, hair color, eye color, etc, etc. Discrimination based on many of these criteria are unconstitutional in job hiring, etc. But in the case of attraction, we seem to be far more permissive in discrimination here. We not only don't see it as not worthy of legal prohibition but we usually don't even see it as unethical in general. We say "It's a woman's prerogative," etc but is there a good reason to see this kind of discrimination as unethical as well?
I think it depends. Certain physical features that a culture thinks attractive certainly are arbitrary. Consider the practice of African female genital and ancient Chinese footbinding. Having mutilated female genitalia and disfigured small feet is considered attractive in those cultures among the men. Now many feminists have (and I think rightfully so) blamed the men as well as the misogynist culture that produced these practices instead of the women in them who actually perform the acts of mutilation. They point out that, that it is men's desires (attraction for a certain feature) that fuels and are inherently part of the institutions of these barbaric practices. Many feminists have also leveled blame at many men for their desire of some kinds of aggressive porn which either explicitly or implicitly mimic rape. They point out that this enforces and contributes to a certain kind of "rape fetish" and thus may further a rape culture.
Now, men do not actually mutilate their daughters in these cultures. It is the women (mothers and grandmothers) who usually do in cutting of their daughters or the binding of their feet but feminist tend to focus the blame on men even when men do not participate in actual mutilation. Can we here say that it is just a "man's prerogative" to be attracted to any feature he pleases? This doesn't seem to satisfy feminists. I think the feminists are right but I also think that the same line of reasoning can be applied (with certain caveats) to certain other features in our culture. I certainly am not saying that discriminating someone based on weight, height, disability, race, hair color, eye color, etc, are as unethical as desiring only women bound feet or mutilated genitalia. The later practices are far worse and discriminating against women who do not have bound feet and mutilated genitalia produce and contribute to institutions far worse than the former.
But certain practices of arbitrary attraction do produce institutions of discrimination. They may not be as harmful (but some may, at least hypothetically be) as footbinding and female genital mutilation but they are still harmful and unjust. People with certain disabilities e.g., can contribute to relationships as meaningful as any one else. So long as the disability does not inhibit certain normal human functions part and parcel of relationships (of a sexual nature, e.g.) discrimination against people with disabilities in attraction and relationships on that bases does seem to be immoral on much the same bases and for some of the same reasons discrimination against women who have normal genitalia and feet does. It's not just a man's or woman's prerogative as institutions of discrimination may be based on or is behind such discrimination.
Now some disabilities do seem to be justifiably discriminated against in this area. Severe mental disability may detriment the meaningfulness of certain relationships such as romantic ones. Other arbitrary discriminatory practices that individuals may have such as if one has a progressive bent and simply would refuse romantic involvement with a rightwinger also does not seem to be unethical because there is no institution of discrimination against rightwingers behind someone's choice and a relationship between two individuals with such radically opposing views may be justifiably hinder meaningfulness. Likewise with people who are way too overweight or underweight to contribute to normal relationship activities and or should be of health concern.
How do we distinguish between some justifiable case (ethically permissible) of discrimination on some trait and some unjustifiable one? Well, I pointed out two criteria above. 1. If the trait seriously may detriment the relationship for no good reasons and is "arbitrary" like certain weight ranges, height, ethnicity, hair color, etc) and 2. that there was an institution of discriminating against these people beforehand which caused the discrimination in attraction. Now the words "arbitrary" and "detrimental" in the two criteria will have to be specified and given more flesh but I think a workable definition is capable of being formulated for moral purposes. There may also be a 3rd criteria that not only is the discrimination a result of past institutions of discrimination within the culture but contributes to furthering institutions of discrimination towards people with those features.
Of course, I don't think there should be laws against this kind of discrimination but I do think there is reason to be less permissive/tolerant towards it than we are. It may not be helpful to blame those who discriminate this way. Ameliorating such practices of discrimination based on these arbitrary and non significant traits may best be accomplished by monitoring and changing cultural practices at large instead of individual practices (such as fair and accurate media representation). It has been widely known among social, behavioral scientists and feminists that certain kinds of "fetishes" can be created "in the lab" quite easily. A mild but remarkably persistent foot fetish has been created in undergraduate men, e.g. and fetishes for certain kinds of foreign accents have been created in women after only a few minutes of conditioning in the lab. These arbitrary and often persistent fetishes are quite easy to create but I suspect that the malleability of what features we are attracted to in general are as well to balance out any previous biases.
Louie's date then seem to loose all interest in Louie. She seems to realize consciously that her loss of interest (and presumably sexual attraction) is irrational as getting into a physical confrontation or even risking one by being more assertive would have been foolish for Louie. But she claims she can't help it and wants to end the date. Louie gets angry at this "fickle" change of heart.
This is an instance of what I will call "the luck of circumstantial attraction." But I am more interested in what will will call "the luck of constitutive attraction" (you may now have noticed the analogy with their analogues in moral luck). Many of us are attracted to people with certain features that are culture and time specific. For example, men today, in general, like women that are a little heavier than men did 30-40 years ago. Men also tend to like women a little lighter than men liked women during when Paul Ruben painted his paintings (hence the term "Rubenesque"). Men in different cultures than ours like women that are heavier or lighter than we do in general depending on the one we're talking about. Likewise with many other features, physical, behavioral and psychological. There is a malleability there that is context and time sensitive.
What is the morality of discriminating against someone based on such arbitrary features? Louie seemed to be upset over his dates change of heart and seems to be rightfully upset especially seeing how irrational it is and how much she even realizes its irrationality but do people who are turned out by equally other arbitrary features also have a more justified complaint? Some of us are constitutively not attracted to people of certain disabilities, weights, heights, ethnicities, hair color, eye color, etc, etc. Discrimination based on many of these criteria are unconstitutional in job hiring, etc. But in the case of attraction, we seem to be far more permissive in discrimination here. We not only don't see it as not worthy of legal prohibition but we usually don't even see it as unethical in general. We say "It's a woman's prerogative," etc but is there a good reason to see this kind of discrimination as unethical as well?
I think it depends. Certain physical features that a culture thinks attractive certainly are arbitrary. Consider the practice of African female genital and ancient Chinese footbinding. Having mutilated female genitalia and disfigured small feet is considered attractive in those cultures among the men. Now many feminists have (and I think rightfully so) blamed the men as well as the misogynist culture that produced these practices instead of the women in them who actually perform the acts of mutilation. They point out that, that it is men's desires (attraction for a certain feature) that fuels and are inherently part of the institutions of these barbaric practices. Many feminists have also leveled blame at many men for their desire of some kinds of aggressive porn which either explicitly or implicitly mimic rape. They point out that this enforces and contributes to a certain kind of "rape fetish" and thus may further a rape culture.
Now, men do not actually mutilate their daughters in these cultures. It is the women (mothers and grandmothers) who usually do in cutting of their daughters or the binding of their feet but feminist tend to focus the blame on men even when men do not participate in actual mutilation. Can we here say that it is just a "man's prerogative" to be attracted to any feature he pleases? This doesn't seem to satisfy feminists. I think the feminists are right but I also think that the same line of reasoning can be applied (with certain caveats) to certain other features in our culture. I certainly am not saying that discriminating someone based on weight, height, disability, race, hair color, eye color, etc, are as unethical as desiring only women bound feet or mutilated genitalia. The later practices are far worse and discriminating against women who do not have bound feet and mutilated genitalia produce and contribute to institutions far worse than the former.
But certain practices of arbitrary attraction do produce institutions of discrimination. They may not be as harmful (but some may, at least hypothetically be) as footbinding and female genital mutilation but they are still harmful and unjust. People with certain disabilities e.g., can contribute to relationships as meaningful as any one else. So long as the disability does not inhibit certain normal human functions part and parcel of relationships (of a sexual nature, e.g.) discrimination against people with disabilities in attraction and relationships on that bases does seem to be immoral on much the same bases and for some of the same reasons discrimination against women who have normal genitalia and feet does. It's not just a man's or woman's prerogative as institutions of discrimination may be based on or is behind such discrimination.
Now some disabilities do seem to be justifiably discriminated against in this area. Severe mental disability may detriment the meaningfulness of certain relationships such as romantic ones. Other arbitrary discriminatory practices that individuals may have such as if one has a progressive bent and simply would refuse romantic involvement with a rightwinger also does not seem to be unethical because there is no institution of discrimination against rightwingers behind someone's choice and a relationship between two individuals with such radically opposing views may be justifiably hinder meaningfulness. Likewise with people who are way too overweight or underweight to contribute to normal relationship activities and or should be of health concern.
How do we distinguish between some justifiable case (ethically permissible) of discrimination on some trait and some unjustifiable one? Well, I pointed out two criteria above. 1. If the trait seriously may detriment the relationship for no good reasons and is "arbitrary" like certain weight ranges, height, ethnicity, hair color, etc) and 2. that there was an institution of discriminating against these people beforehand which caused the discrimination in attraction. Now the words "arbitrary" and "detrimental" in the two criteria will have to be specified and given more flesh but I think a workable definition is capable of being formulated for moral purposes. There may also be a 3rd criteria that not only is the discrimination a result of past institutions of discrimination within the culture but contributes to furthering institutions of discrimination towards people with those features.
Of course, I don't think there should be laws against this kind of discrimination but I do think there is reason to be less permissive/tolerant towards it than we are. It may not be helpful to blame those who discriminate this way. Ameliorating such practices of discrimination based on these arbitrary and non significant traits may best be accomplished by monitoring and changing cultural practices at large instead of individual practices (such as fair and accurate media representation). It has been widely known among social, behavioral scientists and feminists that certain kinds of "fetishes" can be created "in the lab" quite easily. A mild but remarkably persistent foot fetish has been created in undergraduate men, e.g. and fetishes for certain kinds of foreign accents have been created in women after only a few minutes of conditioning in the lab. These arbitrary and often persistent fetishes are quite easy to create but I suspect that the malleability of what features we are attracted to in general are as well to balance out any previous biases.
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
What's the difference between determinism and fatalism?
One way may be to describe the difference in counterfactuals. Fatalism is the thesis that had things been different at some time t, it still would have occurred some event (here we may or may not want to see this event as a token or type, it may not matter) at a later time t'. Determinism has this as a vacuous truth since it could not have been different at time t because events at time t is determined by the events in some previous time and the laws of nature.
The parable of Jesus
Many secular people who admire the story of Jesus will point out that it is a moral parable. It is the story of someone that gave his life for the sins of others and was kind despite the huge costs incurred to himself. It is about redemption. But can our sins be redeemed by punishing someone else, even someone who is purely good? It seems immoral top punish innocent people on behalf of the guilty. Sins don't seem to be transferable. Sometimes some minor sins are for example, fines can usually be paid by the friends and family of the guilty and thus, the guilty incur no harm as a result of the punishment. We seem to have no problem with that kind of transferability of punishment. David Lewis wrote an interesting paper on the topic called Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?. I personally find the redemption parable uninteresting and quite morally barbaric. Punishing a good man for the sins of the sinful seem to be a immoral act.
That aside, however, I believe that there is an alternate interpretation of the story that warrants moral attention. I make an analogy to the ubermensch of Nietzsche. The ubermensch is someone that would choose, out of his own will, a life of great challenge and struggle, if only to exercise his strength, courage and engage in a creative life if only for the sake of the challenge. There is triumph in the struggle and it's more important in Nietzsche's scheme of things to live a beautiful but tragic life than a happy or pleasant life if the later life does not offer the opportunity for struggle and greatness. The virtues of strength and courage and creativity are paramount for Nietzsche. Being all powerful might even prevent someone, say a god, from living such a great life because omnipotence forbids the possibility of true struggle and the exhibition of heroic courage which comes in the face of one's own peril when one struggles against something greater than himself. This is why Nietzsche always thought the Roman Stoic philosopher Epictetus's claim that the gods have good reason to be jealous of man to be insightful and true. This is one kind of paradox which I will call a "paradox of omnipotence." Jean-Luc Godard explored another similar theme in his Hélas Pour Moi. In this film, God takes over the body of a man in order to seduce his wife. It seems that only a man, in all his finitude and imperfection can truly win the love of a woman. A god may manipulate her or coerce her into loving him but he cannot win her love the old fashioned way, i.e., through charm, conversation, etc, all the mere mortal appeals.
Now let's imagine a perfectly moral being. He happens to be all powerful as well. Now I suggest that there is a similar paradoxical limiting of one's virtues by being omnipotent in moral virtues as well (instead of the Nietzschean virtues of strength, courage, and creativity which are not traditionally thought of as moral virtues). How does being omnipotent limit oneself here? Well, it seems to me that only the mortal, the finite, are truly capable of things like moral courage, free will, moral responsibility and so on. An all powerful and all good god cannot be truly morally courageous (what has he got to be justifiably afraid of? What can possibly harm him?). Courage is the overcoming of justified fear through strength of character and will. Without the possibility of justifiable fearing anything, courage is impossible. God may only be "courageous" in a irrational sense that he overcomes an irrational fear. God can seem to do no wrong either and may not seem to have a choice in doing evil as he is determined by his omnibenevolence and his other attributes.
Thus it seems to me that God, or any moral ubermensch, if he is truly all powerful and all good, would necessarily choose to limit his powers by some kind of incarnating himself into mortal form and suffer through the (moral) trials and tribulations of someone that is put into dire situations to test and practice his own moral virtues. This would then be a parable to show that the possibility of being truly good and decent necessarily rests on our finitude. I think that this is an extremely far fetched interpretation of the Bible and it is likely not how it was intended to be read by any of its writers. But for me to see any value in the Bible at all, with all its barbarity, I would have to see it this way.
That aside, however, I believe that there is an alternate interpretation of the story that warrants moral attention. I make an analogy to the ubermensch of Nietzsche. The ubermensch is someone that would choose, out of his own will, a life of great challenge and struggle, if only to exercise his strength, courage and engage in a creative life if only for the sake of the challenge. There is triumph in the struggle and it's more important in Nietzsche's scheme of things to live a beautiful but tragic life than a happy or pleasant life if the later life does not offer the opportunity for struggle and greatness. The virtues of strength and courage and creativity are paramount for Nietzsche. Being all powerful might even prevent someone, say a god, from living such a great life because omnipotence forbids the possibility of true struggle and the exhibition of heroic courage which comes in the face of one's own peril when one struggles against something greater than himself. This is why Nietzsche always thought the Roman Stoic philosopher Epictetus's claim that the gods have good reason to be jealous of man to be insightful and true. This is one kind of paradox which I will call a "paradox of omnipotence." Jean-Luc Godard explored another similar theme in his Hélas Pour Moi. In this film, God takes over the body of a man in order to seduce his wife. It seems that only a man, in all his finitude and imperfection can truly win the love of a woman. A god may manipulate her or coerce her into loving him but he cannot win her love the old fashioned way, i.e., through charm, conversation, etc, all the mere mortal appeals.
Now let's imagine a perfectly moral being. He happens to be all powerful as well. Now I suggest that there is a similar paradoxical limiting of one's virtues by being omnipotent in moral virtues as well (instead of the Nietzschean virtues of strength, courage, and creativity which are not traditionally thought of as moral virtues). How does being omnipotent limit oneself here? Well, it seems to me that only the mortal, the finite, are truly capable of things like moral courage, free will, moral responsibility and so on. An all powerful and all good god cannot be truly morally courageous (what has he got to be justifiably afraid of? What can possibly harm him?). Courage is the overcoming of justified fear through strength of character and will. Without the possibility of justifiable fearing anything, courage is impossible. God may only be "courageous" in a irrational sense that he overcomes an irrational fear. God can seem to do no wrong either and may not seem to have a choice in doing evil as he is determined by his omnibenevolence and his other attributes.
Thus it seems to me that God, or any moral ubermensch, if he is truly all powerful and all good, would necessarily choose to limit his powers by some kind of incarnating himself into mortal form and suffer through the (moral) trials and tribulations of someone that is put into dire situations to test and practice his own moral virtues. This would then be a parable to show that the possibility of being truly good and decent necessarily rests on our finitude. I think that this is an extremely far fetched interpretation of the Bible and it is likely not how it was intended to be read by any of its writers. But for me to see any value in the Bible at all, with all its barbarity, I would have to see it this way.
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
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